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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRANK BAINE, 
Plainti.f.f and Appellant, 
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9049 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF 
The appellant hereby petitions the court for a rehear~ 
ing in the above entitled cause, and assigns therefor, the 
following point-s; 
L Error of the court in holding that appellant pleaded 
guilty to the crime of issuing a check against insufficient 
funds. 
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2. Error of the court in holding that on March 27, 
1959, appellant had a hearing at which he was sworn and 
testified against himself. 
mg: 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
138 South 2nd East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
BRIEF 
To sustain this petition appellant relies on the follow-
STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I. 
NO STATE SHALL DENY TO ANY PERSON 
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQL'AL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
U. S. Constitution, Amendment 14 Sec. 1, 
Sees. 77-51-3 and 77-51-4, utah Code 1953, 
Barnes vs. District Court, 104 P. 282, 16 C. ,J. 
449, 
State vs. Bonza, 150 P. 2nd 970, 
Christiansen vs. HarrW, 163 P. 2nd 314, 
Darnell vs. Haines, 203 P. 712. 
STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 75 (h) it is stipulated that the 
Supplemental record, consisting of Pages 1 to 7, may i>e, 
and is, filed as part of the record on this appeal. 
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In paragraphs 1 and 2 of appellant's petition (R. 1), 
it is alleged that appellant is unlawfully restrained of his 
liberty, in that on or about March 14, 1958, he wa~ convicted 
and sentenced to prison and then placed on probation. The 
respondent admitted these allegations (R. 4). In its opin-
ion, this court said that appellant pleaded guilty to the 
offense charged, and for this reason the verdict of the jury, 
(S. R. 1), is submitted to correct that error. 
This court also states that appellant Wstified that on 
March 27, he was sworn and testified. This statement is 
erroneous and for this reason the record of what transpired 
on that date is submitted to the court for clarification (S. 
R. 6-7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO STATE SHALL DENY TO ANY PERSON 
WITHIN ITS JL'RISDICTION THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
Whether or not the appeilant pleaded guilty or was 
convicted of the offense of issuing a check against insuffi-
cient funds, we think, is immaterial to the issue involved 
on this appeal, hut since the court seems to have placed some 
credence on that fact, we have submitted the verdict of the 
jury, for the scrutiny of the court, (S. R. 1). 
The principle herein contended for is set forth in ap-
pellant's original brief on file herein, and which is made a 
part hereof by reference thereto. 
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In addition to violating the due process clauses therein 
set forth the appellant contends that under the majority 
opinion written in this cause he is denied the equal protec-
tion of the law as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 
This court seems to adhere to the principle laid down 
in the Zolantakis case, decided several years ago, and 
wherein the rule was spelled out in the Bonza case by the 
unanimous opinion of this court, as follows: 
"Where the commission of a sub.sequent offense 
is made the basis of an application for termination 
of probation, and a complaint or information hru; 
been lodged charging probationer with its commis-
sion, action by the prubation court may well abide 
the determination of his guilt or innocence in the 
court before which the prosecution is conducted." 
In approving this rule this court narrowed the appli-
cation thereof as follows: 
"However, if there is dispute about the accusa-
tion upon which the revocation is based, and con-
cerning which reasonable minds might differ, a 
hearing and inquiry into the matter should be held." 
This court refers to Chi'istiansctl vs. Harris, as illus-
trative of the application of this rule wherein, it was held 
that under the circumstances in that case a hearing was 
not required. In the Clm'sfians(;/ case the probationer ap-
peared in court on his regular reporting day and made con-
fessions as follows: ( 1) That he had pleaded guilty to in-
toxication, (2) That he had knowingb· issued several checks 
without funds, (3) That he had never lived up to the ex-
pectations of the court, himself, and everyone else, and (4} 
I have not lived up torn~· promise. 
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In the instant case appellant's conduct had been ex-
emplary, except on one instant when he was accused of 
assaulting one Earlene Kennon with a deadly weapon, a 
charge about which reasonable minds may differ. At the 
present time there is not one scintilla of evidence in the 
entire record which even indicates what the facts were in 
regard to the alleged assault and in this respect, if the facts 
were known, it may be debatable as to whether or not an 
assault of any kind was made. 
The order to show cause was returnable March 16, 
1959, (Ex. 2), at \Yhich time appellant appeared in person 
and by counsel and, upon motion of appellant, the matter 
was continued to March 25 (S. R. 2). On March 25, the 
order to show cause was dismissed, (see stipulation R. 14 
and S. R. 3). 
The appellant appeared in court on March 27, and 
upon being asked by the court if he had had ~orne difficulty 
with his probation and the law, the appellant answered, (not 
under oath), "yes" (S. R. 6). The word difficulty, in and of 
itself, does not imply crime and where one's liberty is at 
stake it certainly should not be construed to mean crime. 
During the inquiry the appellant told the court he had had a 
rnisunderstr;..nding with Miss Kennon ( S. R. 6). By no stretch 
of the ima!{ination can the word misunderstanding imply 
crime. And under our American system of jurisprudence the 
filing of a complaint charging a person with crime iH no evi-
dence that the person accused is guilty. Koone appeared at 
this purported hearing to testify as to what the appellant ac-
tually did on the occasion in question, and for this reason 
there wa~ no evidence whatsoever that appellant had vio-
lated his probation. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
This brings us to the fundamental problem presented 
by the facts of record, namely, First, what effect did the 
dismissal of the order t{) show cause have on the status of 
the proceedings on :illar~h 25 7 Second, what effect did that 
dismissal have on the appellant? and Third, may the state 
lull a probationer into a feeling of security and then, with-
out notice and an opportunity to defend, take advantage of 
him? 
In answer to the first inquiry, Sec. 77-51-4 of the Utah 
Code, provides: 
"The court may, either on its own motion or 
upon the application of the District Attorney, in 
furtherance of justice, order an action, information 
or indictment to be dismissed. The reason for the 
dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon 
the minutes." 
And Sec. 77-51-3 provides: 
"If the court directs the action to be dismissed, 
the defendant must, if in custody, be discharged 
therefrom; or if admitted to bail, his bail shall be 
exonerated, or money deposited instead of bail must 
be refunded to him." 
In B~rnes vs. DWtrict Crmrt. this court construed the 
effects of these statutes with the following language: 
"True, snch a dismissal and discharge might 
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense. But that is another thing. When the action 
was dismissed, and the defendant discharged and 
sent out of court, that put an end to that contro-
versy." 
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In construing the effect of a dismissal of a complaint 
in a civil action the Supreme Court of Kansas in Darnell 
vs. Haines, said, 
"In our opw10n the appeal from the Probate 
Court, gave the Dio;trict Court jurisdiction of the 
entire proceedings, and the dismissal there left noth-
ing pending in the Probate Court." 
Thus it is clear that in both, criminal and civil actions, a 
dismissal of any proceeding leaves nothing pending before 
the court for consideration un the matter dismissed. 
As to the second inquiry, the record shows that on 
March 25, for good cause shown, (S. R. 3), the Order to 
show Cause was dismissed and appellant left court feeling 
that the matter had been disposed of; and it is the position 
of appellant that he was justified in so thinking. This 
brings us to inquiry (3), May the State, by positive and 
affirmative action, mislead a defendant and his counsel by 
inducing them to believe that the particular matter will 
not be pursued any further, and then proceed, without no-
tice, to have the same matter disposed of on the merits 1 
In the footnote to 16 C. J. at page 449, we find this 
language: 
"A trial is a farce-indeed, and no trial at all, 
if the defendant be not given an opportunity to pre-
pare for trial-which is another way of saying an 
opportunity to be heard. It is a mockery, solemnly, 
to assure him that he has a right to defend by him-
self and by his witnesses; and then say to him, when, 
in pursuance of the assurance, he demands his trial, 
you shall not have an opportunity to prepare for 
trial or to produce your witnesses. It goes without 
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saying that the right to a trial without an oppor-
tunity to prepare for it is an idle a fatuous thing." 
The record of March 27, (S. R. 7), indicates the pre-
dicament in which appellant found hii'Illlelf. The record 
also indicates that the whole procedure was maskr-minded 
by the State for the sole purpose of taking undue advantage 
of appellant. And if this type of procedure is to be toler-
ated by this Court, then the door is open to greater mischief 
than that discussed in its opinion in this case. Any dis-
gruntled peri\on may file a complaint against any proba-
tioner; have the complaint dismissed, then have probation 
revoked without probationer having a chance. 
In this case the Respondent has stipulated that a re-
hearing may be had (see stipulation filed Dec. 21). 
CO~CLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the law as enunciated by 
the Court in this case is sounder, more just and equitable 
than that recommended by the minority opinion and, should 
be sustained as the law of this state; and that the procedure 
revealed by the record in this case shows a denial of the 
protection that law offers to every individual, and there-
' 
h ld b d <j.f (l_ t;:on'.pk:•tP rzy//ft;Yt ore, s ou e reverse ~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Att01-ney for Appellant. 
138 South 2nd East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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